CYBRARY A refused action is still an action
The defense worked; the intent is the finding. File the command and the account, and escalate on the intent rather than the outcome.
C-346·Cross-platform·40 min
The swipe at the backups Start this lab
A refused command tries to delete every shadow copy on the backup server. Nothing was lost, and that is exactly why this is the loudest step in the chain. Treat it as the pre-ransom signal, prove the recovery points are intact, and remove the account's reach into them.
Mission brief · C-346
Tier 3 analyst on the incident response bench
Tier 3 — deep host and forensics
Business important
Track default
You are acting as
the break-glass IR account `svc-ir`, checked out of the vault for this incident — never the compromised identity
How you got here
The detection fired in the EDR console. You opened a live-response session from that detection, so your shell rides the EDR agent channel — containing the host will *not* cut you off, which is exactly why you contain from here rather than over SSH.
Your access
EDR console (detections + live response)
Endpoint detection & response
- Read the detection and process tree
- Look up host criticality, owner and VIP flags
- Open a live-response session on the host
- Contain the host over the agent channel
- Not yours: Disable user accounts (that's the identity team)
- Not yours: Delete evidence
Live-response shell on the affected host
Host shell session
- Read the filesystem, logs and running state
- Collect a triage package
- Not yours: Reboot or reimage without owner approval
What's at stake
The affected host
Owner: The system's business owner, named on the asset record
Containing a host you haven't identified can stop revenue. Check criticality and owner before you isolate anything.
Rules of engagement
You may act alone
- Investigate from the live-response session
- Collect evidence and triage packages
- Contain a standard-criticality host
Ask a human first
- Containing a mission-critical host — asset owner and on-call manager first
- Disabling a user identity — identity team, and HR/legal if it looks like an insider
Why this matters
Attempts to remove recovery points almost never happen by accident. Even when the attempt fails, it is the clearest warning a SOC ever gets that encryption is the next step — and the window to act is measured in minutes.
Concepts
Verify recovery, do not assume it
Before escalating, list the recovery points and name the last known-good one. Every decision that follows — pay, rebuild, restore — depends on that single number being real.
Lock the identity out of the backup estate
Backup systems are usually the last thing segmented. Removing the account reach there is the highest-value containment available at this point in the chain.
Objectives graded
- Treat a refused backup deletion as the pre-ransom signal it is
- Verify the recovery points are intact and name the last good one
- Remove the account from the backup estate behind an approval gate
Live walkthrough
The reference response, executed by the same engine that grades your attempt. Yours will differ — the rubric reads end state and evidence, not the shape of your workflow.
- 1.Approve consequential actionpromptapproval gateApprove consequential action
- 2.Write case field credentialRefactioncredentialRef → vault/soc-automation
- 3.Attach evidence: case/soar-c-346/evidenceactionThe learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
- 4.Write case field closureNoteactionclosureNote → written
- 5.Write case field refusedCommandactionrefusedCommand → vssadmin
- 6.verdict on ind-recovery-cmdactionind-recovery-cmd.verdict → malicious
- 7.recoveryVerified on hst-nw-bkp01actionhst-nw-bkp01.recoveryVerified → true
Gate approved — 100%
12 of 12 rubric rules hold.
Gate denied — 91%
Refusing the consequential action is a defensible choice with a measured cost; the difference is what the lab is teaching.
- pass behavior · The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.
- pass safety · A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.
- pass efficiency · No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.
- pass configuration · Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.
- pass investigation · The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
- pass explanation · The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.
- pass behavior · No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.
- pass configuration · The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.
- pass investigation · Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.
- pass investigation · The learner filed the refused recovery-deletion command as the finding.
- pass investigation · The command was judged as pre-ransom behavior, not filed as a failed job.
- pass behavior · The recovery points were verified intact before the incident was escalated.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
A refused attempt to delete every shadow copy — recovery inhibition is the loudest pre-ransom signal there is.
| Technique | Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Impact |
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Impact |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion |
What each rubric rule proves
The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.
behavior · weight 20
A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.
safety · weight 15
No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.
efficiency · weight 10
Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.
configuration · weight 10
The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
investigation · weight 10
The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.
explanation · weight 10
No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.
behavior · weight 15
The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.
configuration · weight 15
Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.
investigation · weight 10
The learner filed the refused recovery-deletion command as the finding.
investigation · weight 20 · T1490 Inhibit System Recovery (Impact)
The command was judged as pre-ransom behavior, not filed as a failed job.
investigation · weight 15 · T1490 Inhibit System Recovery (Impact)
The recovery points were verified intact before the incident was escalated.
behavior · weight 20 · T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact (Impact)
Common mistakes
- Closing the alert because the deletion failed.
- Escalating to ransomware response without checking the recovery points exist.
- Leaving the account backup-estate access in place while containing endpoints.
Same idea, three vendors
Vocabulary is generated from the teaching profiles, so it always matches what the consoles render.
| Concept | Cortex Forge | Summit SOAR | Storyline |
|---|---|---|---|
| approval | Manual task | Prompt | Page |
Where does this value come from?
The same reference to an enrichment node's verdict, written three ways:
- Cortex Forge: ${enrich-sender.verdict}
- Summit SOAR: enrich-sender.verdict
- Storyline: <<enrich-sender.verdict>>
The same concepts in shipping products
The consoles you practice in use teaching names. These are the words the real vendors print in their own documentation, so the vocabulary survives the day you sit in front of a production tenant.
| Concept | Cortex XSOARXSOAR 8.x | Splunk SOARSplunk SOAR 6.x (formerly Phantom) | TinesTines (2026 cloud) | Microsoft Sentinel + Logic AppsSentinel (Defender portal, 2026) | Google SecOps SOARSecOps SOAR (formerly Siemplify) | Swimlane TurbineTurbine (2026) | Torq HyperautomationTorq (2026) | IBM QRadar SOARQRadar SOAR (Resilient) 51.x | ServiceNow Security OperationsSecOps (Flow Designer era) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| approval | Manual (data collection) task | Prompt block | Page (form) / Send to Chat | Approval action (Teams / email) | Manual action | Task / approval action | Approval step (Torq Chat / Slack) | Manual task / phase gate | Approval activity |
What transfers
The same signal appears as cloud snapshot deletion, retention-policy edits and replication being switched off.