Cybrary ForgeCYBRARY / FORGE
Curriculum
H-201·Cross-platform·45 min

Prove it before you isolate: hands-on containment Start this lab

A finance workstation is beaconing and nobody has looked at the host itself. Work it in the range console, through processes, sockets and unit files, file the three facts you can prove, then build the containment playbook around them.

Mission brief · H-201

Tier 3 analyst on the incident response bench

Tier 3 — deep host and forensics
Business important
Track default

You are acting as

the break-glass IR account `svc-ir`, checked out of the vault for this incident — never the compromised identity

How you got here

The detection fired in the EDR console. You opened a live-response session from that detection, so your shell rides the EDR agent channel — containing the host will *not* cut you off, which is exactly why you contain from here rather than over SSH.

Your access

  • EDR console (detections + live response)

    Endpoint detection & response

    • Read the detection and process tree
    • Look up host criticality, owner and VIP flags
    • Open a live-response session on the host
    • Contain the host over the agent channel
    • Not yours: Disable user accounts (that's the identity team)
    • Not yours: Delete evidence
  • Live-response shell on the affected host

    Host shell session

    • Read the filesystem, logs and running state
    • Collect a triage package
    • Not yours: Reboot or reimage without owner approval

What's at stake

The affected host

Owner: The system's business owner, named on the asset record

Containing a host you haven't identified can stop revenue. Check criticality and owner before you isolate anything.

Rules of engagement

You may act alone

  • Investigate from the live-response session
  • Collect evidence and triage packages
  • Contain a standard-criticality host

Ask a human first

  • Containing a mission-critical host — asset owner and on-call manager first
  • Disabling a user identity — identity team, and HR/legal if it looks like an insider

Why this matters

Automation is only as honest as the facts it fires on. This lab hands you the host itself — the same simulated estate, filesystem and network a VM lab boots into — and refuses to record a finding you cannot point at in your own command output, so the playbook you then build is scoped by evidence rather than by the alert's guesswork.

Concepts

A finding is something you surfaced, not something you were told

The console replays your command history server-side and checks that the value you file actually appears in the output. Copying the answer out of the brief fails, exactly as an unverified indicator would fail a peer review.

Enumerate the host before you touch it

Process table, socket table, unit files. Three cheap reads name the beacon, its peer and the thing that restarts it, and they cost nothing compared with isolating the wrong machine.

Containment is consequential on a finance endpoint

Isolating this workstation stops work for a person. The action passes a gate, and the alert batch contains an innocent lookalike so blanket containment shows up as damage in the grade.

Persistence outlives the process

Killing the beacon without removing the unit that respawns it buys minutes. The unit path is graded because eradication, not interruption, is the objective.

Objectives graded

  • Work the host directly in the range console, on the same estate and network the VM labs use
  • Prove the beacon: PID, peer address and the unit file that keeps it alive
  • Build a containment playbook that only touches what the evidence implicates

Live walkthrough

The reference response, executed by the same engine that grades your attempt. Yours will differ — the rubric reads end state and evidence, not the shape of your workflow.

  1. 1.Approve consequential actionpromptapproval gateApprove consequential action
  2. 2.Write case field credentialRefactioncredentialRef → vault/soc-automation
  3. 3.Attach evidence: case/soar-h-201/evidenceactionThe learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
  4. 4.Write case field closureNoteactionclosureNote → written
  5. 5.Attach evidence: range/hst-fin-ws14/sessionactionThe analyst actually worked the host in the range console.
  6. 6.Write case field beaconPidactionbeaconPid → 4412
  7. 7.Write case field c2Ipactionc2Ip → 45.77.203.19
  8. 8.Write case field persistenceUnitactionpersistenceUnit → /etc/systemd/system/nw-telemetry.service
  9. 9.Write case field segmentGatewayactionsegmentGateway → 10.42.24.1
  10. 10.Write case field seatRamGbactionseatRamGb → 16
  11. 11.Write case field seatDiskGbactionseatDiskGb → 512

Gate approved — 100%

16 of 16 rubric rules hold.

Gate denied — 91%

Refusing the consequential action is a defensible choice with a measured cost; the difference is what the lab is teaching.

  • pass behavior · The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.
  • pass safety · A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.
  • pass efficiency · No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.
  • pass configuration · Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.
  • pass investigation · The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
  • pass explanation · The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.
  • pass behavior · No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.
  • pass configuration · The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.
  • pass investigation · Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.
  • pass investigation · The analyst actually worked the host in the range console.
  • pass investigation · The beaconing process was identified by PID from the live process table.
  • pass investigation · The command-and-control address was read off the host's own socket table.
  • pass behavior · The persistence mechanism was located on disk, not guessed from the alert.
  • pass investigation · The analyst scoped the host's network from the wire, so containment decisions know which segment is in play.
  • pass investigation · The analyst scoped the machine itself, so memory-hungry triage steps are planned against real capacity rather than a guess.
  • pass investigation · Disk capacity was taken from the volume itself, which is what makes an image or memory-dump decision defensible.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

A systemd service unit keeps an unsigned binary alive on a finance workstation while it beacons out over HTTPS; the analyst enumerates processes and sockets on the host itself before anything is contained.

TechniqueNameTactic
T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd ServicePersistence
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsCommand and Control
T1057Process DiscoveryDiscovery
T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery
T1489Service StopImpact

What each rubric rule proves

  • The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.

    behavior · weight 20 · T1489 Service Stop (Impact)

  • A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.

    safety · weight 15 · T1489 Service Stop (Impact)

  • No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.

    efficiency · weight 10 · T1049 System Network Connections Discovery (Discovery)

  • Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.

    configuration · weight 10 · T1049 System Network Connections Discovery (Discovery)

  • The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.

    investigation · weight 10 · T1049 System Network Connections Discovery (Discovery)

  • The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.

    explanation · weight 10 · T1049 System Network Connections Discovery (Discovery)

  • No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.

    behavior · weight 15 · T1489 Service Stop (Impact)

  • The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.

    configuration · weight 15 · T1049 System Network Connections Discovery (Discovery)

  • Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.

    investigation · weight 10 · T1057 Process Discovery (Discovery)

  • The analyst actually worked the host in the range console.

    investigation · weight 15 · T1057 Process Discovery (Discovery)

  • The beaconing process was identified by PID from the live process table.

    investigation · weight 10 · T1057 Process Discovery (Discovery)

  • The command-and-control address was read off the host's own socket table.

    investigation · weight 10 · T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (Command and Control)

  • The persistence mechanism was located on disk, not guessed from the alert.

    behavior · weight 10 · T1543.002 Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service (Persistence)

  • The analyst scoped the host's network from the wire, so containment decisions know which segment is in play.

    investigation · weight 5

  • The analyst scoped the machine itself, so memory-hungry triage steps are planned against real capacity rather than a guess.

    investigation · weight 3

  • Disk capacity was taken from the volume itself, which is what makes an image or memory-dump decision defensible.

    investigation · weight 3

Common mistakes

  • Filing values read off the alert instead of values proved on the host.
  • Isolating everything in the batch, including the finance peer that is not involved.
  • Stopping the process and leaving the service unit enabled on disk.

Same idea, three vendors

Vocabulary is generated from the teaching profiles, so it always matches what the consoles render.

ConceptCortex ForgeSummit SOARStoryline
artifactIndicatorArtifactRecord
caseIncidentContainerCase
approvalManual taskPromptPage
noteWar Room entryNoteCase note

Where does this value come from?

The same reference to an enrichment node's verdict, written three ways:

  • Cortex Forge: ${enrich-sender.verdict}
  • Summit SOAR: enrich-sender.verdict
  • Storyline: <<enrich-sender.verdict>>

The same concepts in shipping products

The consoles you practice in use teaching names. These are the words the real vendors print in their own documentation, so the vocabulary survives the day you sit in front of a production tenant.

ConceptCortex XSOARXSOAR 8.xSplunk SOARSplunk SOAR 6.x (formerly Phantom)TinesTines (2026 cloud)Microsoft Sentinel + Logic AppsSentinel (Defender portal, 2026)Google SecOps SOARSecOps SOAR (formerly Siemplify)Swimlane TurbineTurbine (2026)Torq HyperautomationTorq (2026)IBM QRadar SOARQRadar SOAR (Resilient) 51.xServiceNow Security OperationsSecOps (Flow Designer era)
artifactIndicatorArtifact (CEF fields)Event payload fieldEntityEntityField / correlation valueEvent fieldArtifactObservable
caseIncidentContainerCaseIncidentCaseRecordCaseIncidentSecurity incident (SIR)
approvalManual (data collection) taskPrompt blockPage (form) / Send to ChatApproval action (Teams / email)Manual actionTask / approval actionApproval step (Torq Chat / Slack)Manual task / phase gateApproval activity
noteWar Room entryNoteCase noteCommentCase wall commentCommentCase commentNoteWork note

What transfers

Prove the artifact on the endpoint, scope the response to what you proved, gate the consequential step — the discipline that separates automation from an outage.