Cybrary ForgeCYBRARY / FORGE

Analyst vocabulary: ATT&CK, IEC 62443 and the words on a case

The same ideas as Foundations, written the way they appear in a report. Technique and requirement identifiers are published by MITRE and ISA/IEC; the mapping to our labs is ours, and it is not an accreditation.

ATT&CK tactics — the why of a step

A tactic is the attacker's goal at that moment. A technique is how they achieved it.

  • Reconnaissance — Learning about the target before touching it.
  • Resource development — Registering the domains and building the tooling used later.
  • Initial access — The first foothold: phishing, a public-facing flaw, a valid account.
  • Execution — Attacker-controlled code runs on the host.
  • Persistence — Access survives a reboot or a password change.
  • Privilege escalation — From a normal account to an administrative one.
  • Defense evasion — Logs cleared, tooling disabled, names made to look ordinary.
  • Credential access — Passwords, hashes, tokens and keys taken.
  • Discovery — Mapping hosts, shares, accounts and trusts from inside.
  • Lateral movement — Using what was stolen to reach the next machine.
  • Collection — Staging what will be taken.
  • Command and control — The channel back to the operator.
  • Exfiltration — Data leaves.
  • Impact — Encryption, deletion, or a process made to misbehave.

Techniques this range actually performs

Built from the scenario data the labs are graded on — 45 techniques across 16 product-line runs. If a run stops performing one, it leaves this table on its own.

IDTechniqueTactic
T0814Denial of service (ICS)Inhibit response function
T0822External remote services (ICS)Initial access
T0831Manipulation of control (ICS)Impair process control
T0842Network sniffing (ICS)Discovery
T0865Spearphishing attachment (ICS)Initial access
T1003.001LSASS memoryCredential access
T1005Data from local systemCollection
T1018Remote system discoveryDiscovery
T1021.001Remote desktop protocolLateral movement
T1021.002SMB/Windows admin sharesLateral movement
T1027Obfuscated files or informationDefense evasion
T1039Data from network shared driveCollection
T1041Exfiltration over C2 channelExfiltration
T1046Network service discoveryDiscovery
T1048Exfiltration over alternative protocolExfiltration
T1053.005Scheduled taskPersistence
T1070.001Clear Windows event logsDefense evasion
T1071.001Application layer protocol: webCommand and control
T1071.004Application layer protocol: DNSCommand and control
T1078Valid accountsCredential access
T1087Account discoveryDiscovery
T1087.002Domain account discoveryDiscovery
T1098Account manipulationPrivilege escalation
T1098.005Device registrationPersistence
T1110.003Password sprayingCredential access
T1110.004Credential stuffingCredential access
T1114.002Remote email collectionCollection
T1133External remote servicesInitial access
T1135Network share discoveryDiscovery
T1195.002Supply chain compromise: software supply chainInitial access
T1204User executionExecution
T1204.002User execution: malicious fileExecution
T1213Data from information repositoriesCollection
T1486Data encrypted for impactImpact
T1490Inhibit system recoveryImpact
T1543.003Windows servicePersistence
T1546.004Unix shell configuration modificationPersistence
T1547.001Registry Run keyPersistence
T1558.003KerberoastingCredential access
T1565.001Stored data manipulationImpact
T1566PhishingInitial access
T1566.001Phishing: spearphishing attachmentInitial access
T1566.002Phishing: spearphishing linkInitial access
T1567.002Exfiltration to cloud storageExfiltration
T1621Multi-factor authentication request generationCredential access

IEC 62443: zones, conduits, requirements and levels

A zone is a group of assets that share security requirements. A conduit is the controlled path between two zones. Each zone is given a target security level, and the seven foundational requirements say what has to hold at that level.

  • FR 1 Identification and authentication controlEvery human and device is known.
  • FR 2 Use controlAn identity can only do what its role allows.
  • FR 3 System integrityCode, configuration and process data are not silently altered.
  • FR 4 Data confidentialityInformation at rest and in transit stays readable only to those entitled.
  • FR 5 Restricted data flowZones and conduits — traffic crosses only where it is meant to.
  • FR 6 Timely response to eventsIt is noticed, recorded and acted on while it still matters.
  • FR 7 Resource availabilityThe process keeps running; denial of service is survivable.
  • SL 1 — Protection against casual or coincidental misuse.
  • SL 2 — Against intentional misuse with simple means and low resources.
  • SL 3 — Against sophisticated means, moderate resources and specific system knowledge.
  • SL 4 — Against sophisticated means, extended resources and specific system knowledge.
  • Where the range produces the evidence for each requirement is set out on the IEC 62443 pages.

Alert and case vocabulary

  • Critical — Answer now. Evidence is being destroyed, or a safety function is involved.
  • High — Answer this shift. A confirmed attacker behavior on a real asset.
  • Medium — Answer today. Suspicious, with an ordinary explanation still available.
  • Low — Context. Worth having in the case, not worth waking anyone for.

Indicator: an observable value — a hash, a domain, an address. Observable: the same value once it is attached to a case. True positive: the rule was right. Benign true positive: the rule was right and the activity was authorized — the hardest verdict to earn, because it needs the authorization shown, not assumed. Dwell time: first attacker action to detection. MTTD / MTTR: mean time to detect and to respond — the two numbers your scored runs move.